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Politicization of Constitutional Court of Peru: Effects on Constitutional Review

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ABSTRACT

The politicization of the selection process for justices of the Constitutional Court of Peru compromises judicial independence and weakens the legitimacy of constitutional review, which generates distrust in the system of constitutional justice. This study analyzes how such politicization influences decisions about the unconstitutionality, identifies its causal mechanisms, and proposes guidelines for institutional reform. A descriptive-explanatory qualitative approach was employed, based on a systematic documentary analysis of laws, national and inter-American jurisprudence, academic literature, and institutional documents from the 1997–2025 period, complemented by a comparative analysis of the Colombian and Spanish models. Three causal mechanisms were identified: debt of political gratitude, chilling effect in the face of reprisals and the strategic instrumentalization of constitutional review. Furthermore, the arbitrary dismissal of Constitutional Court justices in 1997 was declared by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to have violated Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, whose guarantees of non-repetition remain unfulfilled by the Peruvian State. It is concluded that politicization constitutes a structural threat to the rule of law, that demands a comprehensive reform oriented at decentralizing the appointment power, establishing binding technical criteria and strengthening guarantees of judicial irremovability.

Keywords: *judicial politicization; Congress of the Republic of Peru; judicial independence; constitutional review; institutional legitimacy.*

Politización del Tribunal Constitucional Peruano: efectos en el control de inconstitucionalidad

RESUMEN

La politización en el proceso de selección de magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional peruano compromete la independencia judicial y debilita la legitimidad del control de constitucionalidad, lo cual genera desconfianza ciudadana en el sistema de justicia constitucional. El presente estudio analiza cómo dicha politización influye en las decisiones sobre inconstitucionalidad, identifica sus mecanismos causales y propone lineamientos de reforma institucional. Se empleó un enfoque cualitativo descriptivo-explicativo, basado en análisis documental sistemático de normas, jurisprudencia nacional e interamericana, literatura académica y documentos institucionales del periodo 1997-2025, complementado con análisis comparativo de los modelos colombiano y español. Se identificaron tres mecanismos causales: deuda de gratitud política, efecto inhibitorio ante represalias e instrumentalización estratégica del control constitucional. Asimismo, la destitución arbitraria de magistrados en 1997 fue declarada violatoria del artículo 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, cuyas garantías de no repetición permanecen incumplidas por el Estado peruano. Se concluye que la politización constituye una amenaza estructural al Estado de derecho, que exige una reforma integral orientada a descentralizar el poder de nombramiento, establecer criterios técnicos vinculantes y fortalecer las garantías de inamovilidad judicial.

Palabras clave: *politización judicial; Congreso de la República del Perú; independencia judicial; control de constitucionalidad; legitimidad institucional.*

Cite as

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INTRODUCTION

The politicization of the selection process for magistrates of the Peruvian Constitutional Court compromises objectivity in decisions on unconstitutionality and weakens the legitimacy of constitutional review in the country. This phenomenon erodes the perception of institutional independence, affects the protection of fundamental rights, and generates public distrust in the constitutional justice system. The problem is aggravated by the existence of regulatory mechanisms that favor political clientelism and short-term governance at the expense of institutional stability.

The appointment process for magistrates in Peru is centralized in Congress, without effective participation by other branches of government or civil society. The 1993 Constitution has facilitated the political capture of the process through partisan arrangements, which has resulted in judicial decisions with political biases and a progressive weakening of the Court's independence. In contrast, countries such as Colombia and Spain have introduced mechanisms that distribute the selection authority among multiple bodies and establish binding technical criteria, achieving higher levels of independence and institutional legitimacy.

Understanding how the politicization of the selection process affects the credibility and functioning of the Constitutional Court is therefore an urgent analytical need. This research seeks to identify the structural, regulatory, and operational shortcomings that facilitate the political capture of the process and to propose institutional reforms based on best practices in comparative law. These guidelines aim to design a more transparent, merit-based, and participatory selection system that guarantees the independence of magistrates and strengthens the effective protection of fundamental rights.

The main objective of the research is to analyze how politicization in the selection process for magistrates of the Peruvian Constitutional Court influences decisions on unconstitutionality. Specifically, it seeks to identify the structural and regulatory deficiencies that facilitate this politicization, assess its impact on the independence and impartiality of the Court, and propose institutional reform guidelines that strengthen a more inclusive and technically rigorous selection system. In doing so, the research seeks to contribute to the debate on the consolidation of the rule of law and the protection of constitutional rights in Peru.

METHODS

Approach and type of research

The present research adopts a qualitative approach oriented toward the comprehensive and interpretive analysis of complex institutional phenomena. This approach is appropriate for examining how the politicization of the magistrate selection process influences the decisions of the Constitutional Court, given that the object of study involves political, institutional, and legal dynamics whose understanding requires an in-depth analysis of contexts, motivations, and meanings rather than quantitative measurements.

The research is descriptive-explanatory in nature. It is descriptive because it systematically characterizes and documents the phenomenon of the politicization of the Peruvian Constitutional Court, identifying its manifestations, mechanisms, and relevant dimensions. It is explanatory because it seeks to establish causal relationships between the politicization of the magistrate selection process (independent variable) and the characteristics of the decisions issued in unconstitutionality proceedings (dependent variable), determining the causal mechanisms through which this influence operates.

Data collection method

The central methodological strategy consisted of the systematic collection of legal, regulatory, jurisprudential, and academic documents related to the Peruvian Constitutional Court and the issue of its politicization. The following types of documents were collected:

Regulatory documents: Political Constitution of Peru (1993) (Articles 200–203, concerning the Constitutional Court and constitutional review), Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (Law No. 28301) (2004), New Constitutional Procedural Code (Law No. 31307) (2021), and complementary regulations on the selection of magistrates.

Jurisprudential documents: landmark judgments of the Constitutional Court in unconstitutionality proceedings, particularly those with a high political content or that generated public controversy: Case No. 002-96-I/TC (Constitutional Court, 1997), concerning a second presidential reelection; Case No. 0030-2005-AI/TC (Constitutional Court, 2006), concerning the removal of magistrates; Case No. 05031-2022-PA/TC (Constitutional Court, 2025), concerning rare and orphan diseases; and recent cases concerning conflicts between the branches of government. Likewise, judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the cases *Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru* (IACtHR, 2001), *Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2008), and *Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2009) are included, as they are relevant to the analysis of the Inter-American standard of judicial independence.

Academic literature: scientific articles in indexed journals, specialized books, doctoral and master's theses, and research reports from academic institutions on constitutional justice, judicial independence, and the politicization of courts in comparative contexts.

Institutional documents: press releases from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, 2019) concerning the selection processes for magistrates in Peru, documents from civil society organizations on the monitoring of selection processes, documented journalistic reports on political negotiations, and reports from international organizations on the rule of law in Peru.

Documentary analysis method

The analysis of the collected documents was carried out using the following techniques:

- A. Systematic regulatory analysis:** detailed examination of the current constitutional and legal framework to identify the rules governing the composition and functions of the Constitutional Court, the mechanism for the selection of magistrates, the unconstitutionality proceedings, standing to bring proceedings, and guarantees of judicial independence.
- B. Jurisprudential analysis:** critical study of landmark judgments of the Constitutional Court and the IACtHR, applying the case analysis methodology, which includes identification of the political-institutional context of the case, analysis of the legal arguments of the parties, examination of the reasoning of the court's judgment, identification of the position of each magistrate's vote, analysis of separate opinions (concurring and dissenting), assessment of consistency with previous precedents, and identification of patterns suggesting the influence of political considerations.
- C. Thematic content analysis:** thematic coding of academic literature and institutional documents to identify recurring categories, main arguments, empirical evidence, and conclusions concerning the issue of politicization.
- D. Comparative analysis:** systematic comparison between the Peruvian model and the Colombian and Spanish models, identifying similarities and differences in selection

mechanisms, institutional strengths and weaknesses, outcomes in terms of judicial independence and social legitimacy, and lessons applicable to the Peruvian case.

E. Critical-interpretive analysis: interpretation of findings in light of the theoretical framework on judicial politicization, judicial independence, and the rule of law, establishing causal connections between variables and constructing coherent explanations of the phenomenon under study.

RESULTS

The systematic examination of regulatory sources, jurisprudential decisions, specialized literature, and institutional documentation related to the Peruvian Constitutional Court has revealed significant elements demonstrating how the politicization of the appointment of magistrates affects the resolutions adopted in constitutional disputes.

Structural deficiencies of the regulatory framework

The analysis of the current constitutional and legal framework reveals fundamental shortcomings in the institutional architecture of the Peruvian Constitutional Court. The 1993 Constitution, specifically Article 201, provides that the seven members of the collegiate body shall be appointed by the legislative body with the approval of two-thirds of its legal composition, which represents 87 votes out of the 130 members of Congress. This regulation exclusively centralizes in a single branch of government—the Congress—the entirety of the powers to propose and appoint magistrates, excluding the participation of other state institutions and organized citizens.

The comparative evaluation with successful institutional systems at the international level, particularly the Colombian system, demonstrates that this absolute centralization constitutes a considerable structural weakness. In the Colombian case, three different bodies (the Presidency of the Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Council of State) propose shortlists of candidates, and the Senate is responsible for making the final selection among these proposals, which decentralizes the appointment power and significantly mitigates the risk of partisan co-optation.

The regulations governing the Constitutional Court organically (Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, Law No. 28301, 2004) develop the selection procedure in Article 8 and formally provide that it must include “a phase of preliminary evaluation of the personal, academic, and professional background of the candidates, as well as an assessment of their knowledge.” However, a detailed examination of this body of regulations reveals the absence of binding objective technical parameters for assessing the suitability of applicants.

The legal framework also does not incorporate mandatory mechanisms that guarantee the participation of civil society entities, professional organizations, academic institutions, or human rights organizations in the assessment of candidates or in the oversight of the selection procedure. Additionally, although Article 201 of the Constitution establishes five-year terms without the possibility of immediate successive appointment, safeguards against arbitrary removals are weak, as evidenced by the historical precedent of 1997.

Empirical evidence of politicization in selection processes

The documentation collected provides compelling empirical evidence regarding the political appropriation of the system. The study by Campos Bernal (2022) specifically documents how political practice has distorted the formal requirements of the selection process, transforming it into a scenario of partisan bargaining in which the distribution of political quotas prevails over any rigorous technical assessment.

The appointment procedure carried out in July 2013 represents a paradigmatic case. Audio recordings disseminated by the media revealed that the main political forces with parliamentary representation (Partido Nacionalista, Fuerza Popular, and Alianza por el Gran Cambio) had previously agreed on the distribution of the six vacancies on the Constitutional Court, ensuring that each political sector would obtain the agreed positions regardless of the candidates' qualifications.

The statements issued by the IACHR (2019) on different occasions have expressed concern regarding the appointment procedures. In September 2019, the IACHR expressed its concern over the lack of publicity and transparency in the selection process. Subsequently, in May 2022, it received complaints regarding the lack of transparency, debate, and public scrutiny during the process for electing six members of the Constitutional Court.

Patterns identified in the jurisprudential analysis

The study of landmark decisions of the Constitutional Court reveals recurring patterns that demonstrate the influence of political considerations on judicial decisions. The paradigmatic case is the Constitutional Court Judgment, Case No. 002-96-I/TC (1997), concerning the Law on Authentic Interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution, which authorized the immediate second presidential reelection of Alberto Fujimori. Three magistrates (Manuel Aguirre Roca, Delia Revoredo Marsano, and Guillermo Rey Terry) voted to declare the law inapplicable on the grounds that it violated the principle of non-retroactivity, while four magistrates voted in the opposite direction, upholding the provision.

The political consequence was drastic: on May 28, 1997, Congress, dominated by the Fujimori majority, arbitrarily dismissed the three dissenting magistrates, as extensively documented by Jiménez Mayor (2021). This precedent empirically demonstrates that the lack of strong institutional guarantees of security of tenure exposes constitutional magistrates to concrete political retaliation when they exercise effective constitutional review contrary to the interests of the dominant political power.

This precedent generates what specialized doctrine calls a persistent *chilling effect*, in which current and future magistrates self-censor legal positions that, although constitutionally grounded, could provoke adverse reactions from political power, thereby prospectively conditioning the independent exercise of the judicial function.

The legal consequences of the arbitrary dismissal in 1997 transcend the national sphere. The IACtHR directly addressed this case in the judgment *Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru* (IACtHR, 2001) and held that the Peruvian State violated the judicial guarantees enshrined in Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights by depriving the dismissed magistrates of proceedings with due guarantees. The Court ordered, as a measure of reparation, their reinstatement in their positions and payment of the remuneration they had failed to receive. This ruling established a fundamental Inter-American standard: judicial security of tenure is not a privilege of the magistrate, but a guarantee of the litigant; its violation affects not only the judge who was removed, but every person whose rights depended on independent constitutional review.

This standard was consolidated by the IACtHR in the cases *Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2008) and *Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2009), where it was established that the arbitrary dismissal of judges gives rise to an obligation of full reparation with three inseparable components: reinstatement in office, compensation for material and non-material damages, and guarantees of non-repetition, which require the State to reform the regulatory framework that made the removal possible. The Peruvian State did not implement the reforms required by this standard following the 2001 judgment and maintained the monopolistic

concentration of appointment power in Congress and weak guarantees of security of tenure. The chilling effect identified as the second causal mechanism in this research is therefore not only a factual consequence of politicization, but also the result of a continuing failure to comply with the international obligations of the Peruvian State.

The examination of more recent cases demonstrates the continuity of problematic patterns. The constitutional challenge filed in October 2023 against the Law amending Law No. 29158, Organic Law of the Executive Branch, regarding the assumption of the Office of the President of the Republic and its management through digital technologies (Law No. 31810), illustrates the phenomenon of the political instrumentalization of constitutional review: the action was filed by opposition members of Congress in a context of tensions with the Executive, suggesting that the proceeding was used as a tool of political confrontation rather than as a genuine mechanism for constitutional defense.

The systematic analysis makes it possible to identify four recurring patterns: first, political convergence in sensitive matters, where magistrates' votes tend to correlate with the positions of the political forces that promoted their appointment; second, susceptibility to retaliation; third, the instrumental use of constitutional review; and fourth, jurisprudential inconsistency, where the court presents divergent reasoning in similar cases when they involve different political actors.

Concrete impacts on constitutional justice

The academic studies analyzed provide evidence of the concrete consequences of politicization in constitutional justice. The research by Quiñónez Oré (2025) identifies that politicization generates among citizens the perception that their rights are not defended equitably, which erodes trust in the constitutional justice system. This perception produces two adverse effects on access to justice: a deterrent effect, whereby citizens refrain from using the system because they consider that the outcomes are politically predetermined, and an instrumentalization effect, whereby political actors with resources strategically employ the process as a tool of confrontation.

The effectiveness of constitutional review is compromised through multiple channels. The doctrine analyzed documents that, when judgments are perceived as politically motivated, they lose their capacity to generate voluntary compliance. As Cruz Villalón (2014) argues, the legitimacy of constitutional courts does not derive from their democratic origin, but from the technical quality of their reasoning and the perception of impartiality. When this legitimacy of exercise is compromised by politicization, the court loses its ability to effectively bind the other branches of government.

The right to effective judicial protection within a reasonable time is systematically violated in contexts of politicization. Quiñónez Oré (2025) demonstrates that politicization compromises judicial independence by generating a "debt of gratitude" toward the political groups that proposed the magistrates, which may influence the pace at which matters of high political sensitivity are processed. The documents provide evidence of cases that remain under deliberation for prolonged periods when they involve the interests of the political majorities that control the court, or unusual accelerations of cases that favor certain political forces according to specific circumstances.

Judicial independence, the essential core of the rule of law, is structurally eroded by politicization. The analysis reveals that the absence of genuine independence exposes the court to acting as another political power, validating the actions of public authorities on grounds of expediency rather than legal rigor. As Aragón Trelles and Sánchez Flórez (2023) point out, the Constitutional Court ceases to be perceived as a neutral interpreter of the

Constitution and becomes a “third chamber” of Congress, a space for the extension of political conflicts whose majorities can be configured through the strategic appointment of like-minded magistrates.

Lessons from Comparative Law

The comparative assessment of international experiences provides valuable insights into alternative institutional arrangements. The Colombian system, whose selection model is regulated by Articles 239 and 241 of the Political Constitution of Colombia (1991) and has been analyzed in terms of its effects on judicial activism by Uprimny Yepes (2001), presents successful elements that are directly applicable to the Peruvian context. The Colombian Constitutional Court is composed of nine magistrates elected by the Senate for individual eight-year terms without reelection, but the distinctive element lies in the fact that they are selected from shortlists submitted by three different bodies: the President submits three shortlists, the Supreme Court submits three shortlists, and the Council of State submits three shortlists. This multiple nomination mechanism distributes the power to propose candidates among the Executive, the highest judicial body, and the administrative justice body, preventing the monopoly of a single actor and significantly reducing the risk of political-partisan capture.

Por contraste, el examen del sistema español proporciona advertencias importantes. Pese a que el Tribunal Constitucional español tiene dispersión formal del poder de nombramiento entre cuatro órganos distintos, en la práctica los nombramientos se han convertido en objeto de negociación partidista. La experiencia española demuestra que la dispersión formal es insuficiente si la cultura política permite acuerdos de cuotas opacos, sin transparencia real ni participación ciudadana efectiva.

Worsening through recent legislative reforms

The documentation analyzed regarding the New Constitutional Procedural Code (Law No. 31307) (2021) reveals an intensification of the problem through restrictions on standing to bring proceedings. Article 98 of the Code requires the Prosecutor of the Nation to act with the prior agreement of the Board of Supreme Prosecutors in order to file unconstitutionality actions, a condition not contemplated in Article 203 of the Constitution. As Fernández Delgado and Puerta Chávez (2021) criticize, this requirement created by ordinary law violates the principle of constitutional supremacy, unduly limiting access to constitutional review.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this research confirm the hypothesis that the politicization of the selection process for magistrates of the Peruvian Constitutional Court systematically influences the decisions issued in unconstitutionality proceedings and compromises judicial independence and the effectiveness of constitutional review. The three causal mechanisms identified—political debt of gratitude, chilling effect due to the threat of retaliation, and strategic instrumentalization—operate synergistically, creating a system in which political considerations contaminate judicial reasoning.

These results are consistent with the approaches of Cruz Villalón (2014) and Quiñónez Oré (2025) regarding how appointment mechanisms that generate political debts compromise the legitimacy of exercise of constitutional courts. The empirical evidence from the Peruvian case validates their warning that the legitimacy of constitutional courts does not derive from their democratic origin, but from the technical quality of their reasoning and the perception of impartiality. When this legitimacy is compromised, as has occurred in Peru, the court loses its ability to effectively bind the other branches of government.

The comparative analysis reveals that the Peruvian institutional design suffers from structural vulnerabilities that other systems have managed to mitigate. The Colombian model demonstrates that the dispersion of appointment power among multiple bodies, combined with broad standing to bring proceedings, can generate courts with greater independence and social legitimacy. However, the Spanish experience warns that formal reforms are insufficient without changes in political culture and without effective mechanisms for transparency and citizen participation.

A particularly concerning finding is that recent legislative reforms, rather than correcting the problem, have aggravated it through restrictions on standing to bring proceedings that limit access to constitutional review. This demonstrates that Congress itself uses its legislative power to strategically condition who may activate constitutional review, thereby deepening the institutional crisis.

The impacts identified on access to justice, the effectiveness of constitutional review, reasonable time limits, and judicial independence are consistent with the findings of Quiñónez Oré (2025) and Lovatón (2025) regarding the erosion of Peruvian constitutional justice. The public perception that the court acts as a third chamber of Congress generates a discouraging effect that compromises the legitimate use of the system by citizens with genuine claims.

The historical precedent of 1997, exhaustively analyzed by Jiménez Mayor (2021), continues to project a chilling effect on current magistrates. The arbitrary dismissal of three magistrates in retaliation for their judicial votes constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of judicial independence, which, having not been prevented through strong institutional reforms, remains a latent threat that prospectively conditions the court's decisions.

The Inter-American dimension of this issue significantly broadens the analysis. The arbitrary dismissal of the magistrates in 1997 not only projects an internal chilling effect; it also compromises the international responsibility of the Peruvian State before the Inter-American system. The judgment *Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru* (IACtHR, 2001) determined that such dismissal constituted an autonomous violation of Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and ordered guarantees of non-repetition that the State failed to implement by not reforming the regulatory framework that made the retaliation possible. This omission was reaffirmed as a structural pattern by subsequent Inter-American doctrine: in the cases *Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2008) and *Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela* (IACtHR, 2009), the IACtHR consolidated the criterion that guarantees of non-repetition in cases of arbitrary dismissal of judges require concrete institutional reforms, not merely formal declarations. Whenever a current Peruvian magistrate self-censors a legally well-founded position out of fear of retaliation—the *chilling effect* identified in this article (Jiménez Mayor, 2021; Quiñónez Oré, 2025)—the harm is renewed and perpetuated, the non-repetition of which the State undertook to prevent more than two decades ago. In this regard, the institutional reforms proposed in the conclusions are not merely recommendations based on comparative policy, but obligations of result arising from the Inter-American standard of reparation that the Peruvian State still has pending effective compliance with (IACtHR, 2001; 2008; 2009).

The deficiencies in the regulatory framework identified—monopolistic concentration of appointment power, absence of binding technical criteria, exclusion of citizen participation, and weak guarantees of security of tenure—are not merely technical imperfections, but structural vulnerabilities that systematically facilitate the political-partisan capture of the court. As documented by Campos Bernal (2022), political practice has completely distorted the formal requirements, turning the selection process into a space for partisan negotiation.

The consistency of these findings with the statements of international organizations such as the IACHR strengthens their validity. The repeated expressions of concern by the IACHR regarding the lack of transparency and objective criteria confirm that the problem is not a subjective perception, but an institutional reality recognized internationally. A limitation of this research is that, because it is based on qualitative documentary analysis, it cannot establish precise statistical correlations between politicization and specific voting patterns. Future research could complement this analysis with quantitative methods.

CONCLUSIONS

The politicization of the Peruvian Constitutional Court constitutes a structural threat to the rule of law that systematically contaminates judicial reasoning through three interrelated mechanisms: the political debt of gratitude that conditions magistrates' decisions toward those who appointed them, the chilling effect that generates self-censorship in the face of the threat of retaliation, and strategic instrumentalization that turns constitutional review into a partisan battleground.

The jurisprudential analysis confirms these dynamics by revealing systematic patterns of alignment with the positions of the political forces involved in the appointments. The Inter-American dimension of this issue is equally significant: the judgment *Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru* (IACtHR, 2001) declared the international responsibility of the Peruvian State for the arbitrary dismissal of magistrates and ordered guarantees of non-repetition that remain unfulfilled, demonstrating that the politicization of the Court is not merely a problem of internal institutional design, but a situation that compromises the State's international obligations regarding judicial independence.

The consequences are devastating for all the pillars of constitutional justice: effective access to justice is compromised, the legitimacy of constitutional review is eroded, the right to reasonable time limits is violated, and the judicial function is subordinated to criteria of political expediency. Comparative experience offers valuable lessons: the Colombian model demonstrates that multiple co-optation can generate courts with strong independence, while the Spanish case warns that formal safeguards are insufficient without a robust constitutional culture.

Therefore, it is imperative to implement comprehensive reform that includes the adoption of a multiple co-optation system to disperse appointment power, the establishment of binding technical criteria for the selection of magistrates, the strengthening of security-of-tenure guarantees, the institutionalization of mechanisms for citizen participation and radical transparency, and the prohibition of revolving doors between political-partisan and judicial positions. The viability of the Peruvian rule of law critically depends on restoring the independence and legitimacy of its highest constitutional interpreter.

Authorship contribution

KNCA: research, methodology, writing—original draft, drafting, revision, and editing

ANGA: data curation, visualization, project management

MCGG: conceptualization, formal analysis, resources, software, supervision, validation

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

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