

# The attenuated presidentialism and its ambivalence in Peru, in comparison with European parliamentarism



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## ABSTRACT

This study examines the Peruvian political regime, based on a model of attenuated presidentialism that combines parliamentary mechanisms within a presidential structure. Through a theoretical and practical approach, Latin American presidentialism, European parliamentarism, and the Peruvian hybrid model are compared, revealing tensions arising from its mixed configuration. Although the mechanisms incorporated aim to limit presidential power and foster collaboration between branches, their effectiveness depends on factors such as the correlation of forces in Congress and political leadership. The ambivalence of the system is highlighted, as it can both facilitate governability in contexts of cooperation and generate crises in scenarios of confrontation. The analysis addresses cases ranging from the 1992 self-coup to the current government of Dina Boluarte, showing how this ambivalence is manifested in practice. It is concluded that the success of attenuated presidentialism depends not only on its normative design but also on the democratic quality of its operators.

**Keywords:** presidentialism; parliamentarism; attenuated presidentialism; government; president.

## El presidencialismo atenuado y su ambivalencia en el Perú, en comparación con el parlamentarismo europeo

## RESUMEN

El presente trabajo examina el régimen político peruano, basado en un modelo de presidencialismo atenuado que combina mecanismos parlamentarios dentro de una estructura presidencialista. A través de un enfoque teórico y práctico, se comparan el presidencialismo latinoamericano, el parlamentarismo europeo y el modelo híbrido peruano, revelando tensiones derivadas de su configuración mixta. Aunque las herramientas incorporadas buscan limitar el poder presidencial y fomentar la colaboración entre poderes, su eficacia depende de factores como la correlación de fuerzas en el Congreso y el liderazgo político. Se resalta la ambivalencia del sistema, que puede tanto facilitar la gobernabilidad en contextos de cooperación como generar crisis en escenarios de confrontación. El análisis aborda casos, desde el autogolpe de 1992 hasta el actual gobierno de Dina Boluarte, evidenciando cómo esta ambivalencia se manifiesta en la práctica. Se concluye que el éxito del presidencialismo atenuado no depende solo de su diseño normativo, sino de la calidad democrática de sus operadores.

**Palabras clave:** presidencialismo; parlamentarismo; presidencialismo atenuado; gobierno; presidente.

### Cite as

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## INTRODUCTION

The Peruvian political system is regulated by the Political Constitution of 1993, which establishes a classic separation into three branches of the State: the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial. As stated in Article 43, each of these branches has clearly delimited functions and specific mechanisms of mutual control. At the same time, the form of government adopted is attenuated presidentialism, characterized by combining elements typical of presidentialism with tools characteristic of the parliamentary system.

In concrete terms, the president has powers established in Articles 110° to 118° of the Constitution, highlighting the direction of the government's general policy, the power to issue legislative decrees in extraordinary situations, and the faculty to dissolve Congress under specific circumstances provided for in Articles 134° and 135°.

It is in this normative context, in order to understand in depth the form of government in Peru, that it becomes fundamental to comprehend the essential differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism, and then to delve into the main axis of this study: the hybrid model of Peruvian attenuated presidentialism.

In this regard, it should be noted that the Peruvian political regime was the object of multiple transformations throughout its constitutional history, currently configuring itself as an attenuated presidential system. This hybrid model combines elements of both classical presidentialism and parliamentarism, therefore generating a singular institutional structure. Its analysis is key to understanding the dynamics of power and governability in contemporary Peru.

Likewise, the adoption of parliamentary institutions within an originally presidential scheme produced and produces tensions that do not always find resolution in the constitutional text itself. The coexistence of mechanisms of mutual control, such as the question of confidence or the possibility of dissolution of Congress, has led to scenarios of high political conflictivity. For that reason, it is necessary to examine the scope and effects of this institutional mixture.

Thus, this study offers a critical review of attenuated presidentialism in Peru, identifying its theoretical foundations, its normative evolution, and the challenges it poses in practice. Through the contrast with models such as Latin American presidentialism and European parliamentarism, it seeks to delimit the particularities of the Peruvian case. Likewise, the ambivalent character of the system is explored, whose effectiveness depends both on its legal design and on the political context in which it operates.

## DEVELOPMENT

### Presidentialism: the Latin American case

Presidentialism is a form with broad development in the Americas, while parliamentarism, for its part, is so in Europe (Fernández Barbadillo, 2012). This form of government implies the existence of an executive power that possesses greater attributions in comparison with the other two powers of the State. In turn, the President of the Republic is granted legislative powers through the initiative of law, the convening of extraordinary legislative sessions, legislating through emergency decrees, among others (Tupayachi Sotomayor, 2011).

With respect to its origins, relying on what was proposed by Castillo Freyre (2002), presidentialism had its origin in the United States with the Constitution of 1787, designed as a response to the failures of the rigid separation of powers in Europe and with the objective of balancing authority and control among the powers of the State. From its beginnings, it was characterized by a president with autonomy and his own executive functions, elected by the people, with subordinate ministers and without dependence on Parliament, thus structuring a government with a sharp separation of powers and strong unipersonal leadership in the Executive Branch.

Presidentialism, in general terms, is that form of government in which the Executive possesses broad constitutional powers and has full control over the composition of its cabinet and the administration of state power. In addition, the president is elected by the people for a fixed period, without depending on the formal approval of parliament to remain in office (Ayala Silva et al., 2023).

On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the presidential model was not implemented uniformly in Latin America. In this regard, Serrafiero (1991) points out that Jacques Lambert proposed a new terminology, describing the institutional configuration of the region as a regime of presidential preponderance; furthermore, for Lambert, the replication of the United States model did not prevent coups d'état, since the underlying causes were related to fractured societies and recurrent emergencies, not solely to institutional design.

Villabella Armengol (2006) highlights that Latin American presidentialism concentrates legislative, veto, and emergency powers to a greater degree than the United States model, even when counterbalances such as limiting reelection or strengthening ministerial oversight are attempted.

Likewise, since the nineteenth century, Hispano-American constitutions granted presidents legislative, appointment, and emergency powers greater than those of the United States model, thus consolidating a structurally strengthened Executive (Garcé, 2017).

Based on the foregoing, presidentialism, although inspired by the United States model, acquired particular characteristics in Latin America that have transformed it into a regime with a strong concentration of power in the Executive. This adaptation, conditioned by historical, social, and political factors, has generated systems in which the president not only governs, but also decisively influences the legislative process and the direction of the State.

## Parliamentarism

The origin of parliamentarism occurred in England, after the Second World War, and its main characteristics were understood by Espinoza Toledo (2020) as:

- a) The separation of Executive power between a Head of State and a Head of Government.
- b) The obligation of the government to be accountable to Parliament.
- c) The power to dissolve the Lower House.

Likewise, the author indicated that these particularities emerged in Great Britain during the eighteenth century, when the cabinet began to act independently of the monarch, assuming political responsibility before the House of Commons, although it retained the capacity to request from the king the dissolution of that Chamber. In addition, it is important to note that, unlike the medieval period, in which there were their own assemblies to govern, in modern parliamentarism Parliament acts on the basis of a representative mandate (Abellán, 1996).

In turn, for Escamilla (1992), British parliamentarism developed on the basis of parliamentary laws, legal customs, and constitutional conventions, in addition to the fact that its operation is marked by a two-party system, a simple majority electoral model, and the influence of public opinion. In this system, the Executive Power is divided between the monarch, who fulfills a symbolic role as Head of State, and the prime minister, the true Head of Government.

## Brief differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism

After the development of both forms of government, the first notable difference concerns the power granted to the highest representative of the Executive Power, the President of the Republic. As pointed out by Guzmán Napurí (2020), the presidential system is characterized by a president who concentrates the functions of Head of State and Head of Government, unlike parliamentarism, where these are separated. In turn, decision-making falls mainly on the president, and ministers fulfill a secondary role.

On the other hand, another important difference is that in parliamentarism the government depends directly on the confidence of Parliament, which implies that it may be dismissed through a motion of censure. In contrast, in the presidential system, the president has a fixed term and his or her permanence in office does not depend on the constant approval of the Legislative.

This distinction directly influences the dynamics of governability and political control: while parliamentarism tends to foster greater cooperation between powers and allows more flexible adjustments in the face of political crises, presidentialism may generate institutional deadlocks when there is an opposition Congress. As noted by De la Torre Barba (2019), in presidential systems, the concentration of power in the Executive may transgress the autonomy of the other powers, making governability difficult in contexts of disagreement between the Executive and the Legislative.

In this same line, Martínez Dalmau (2015) warns that Latin American presidentialism tends to accentuate the imbalances between the powers of the State, especially in contexts of institutional crisis, while parliamentarism favors more dynamic mechanisms of political control. Likewise, presidentialism centralizes power in the Executive, which may favor the implementation of radical policies, especially when it is accompanied by leadership of an authoritarian nature (Pino Uribe, 2024).

When comparing both forms of government, it is evident that presidentialism and parliamentarism respond to different institutional models and political logics, each with its own implications in terms of governability, balance of powers, and political control. While in parliamentarism greater interaction and oversight between the Executive and the Legislative is favored, promoting a more flexible response to political crises, presidentialism is characterized by a strong concentration of power in the figure of the president, which, although it may facilitate decision-making, also increases the risk of authoritarianism and institutional deadlock in contexts of political tension.

## Attenuated presidentialism

In order to understand attenuated presidentialism in the Peruvian State, it is pertinent first to briefly observe the forms of government in other Latin American countries, as well as the different modalities of organization of political power that have been adopted in similar institutional contexts.

## Other presidential models in Latin America

The analysis begins with the case of Argentina, where the 1994 constitutional reform introduced the figure of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, an official appointed by the president, but subject to political control by Congress, which may even censure him. This institutional innovation had as its main purpose to moderate the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive; nevertheless, specialized literature has widely debated its effectiveness as a real mechanism to contain presidentialism (Serrafero, 2003).

On the other hand, in the Colombian case, the constitutional design incorporated various mechanisms of parliamentary control, such as summons, requests for information, motions

of censure and of observation, which strengthen the oversight capacity of Congress. Although the president retains a predominant position within the political system, these tools have increased the political responsibility of the Executive, constituting manifestations of the principle of separation of powers and accountability. In turn, constitutional control over these practices fulfills a dual function: it limits the arbitrary exercise of power and strengthens democracy, by ensuring that the actions of public officials conform to the values, principles, and rights established in the Constitution, thus consolidating democratic legitimacy and governance based on law (Ortega Ruiz, 2024).

In the Chilean case, after the 1980 Constitution, reformed on several occasions, a strong presidentialism was consolidated; however, Congress retains significant checks and collegislative powers that force the Executive to negotiate continuously, so that presidential power, although broad, is not absolute (Bronfman Vargas, 2016). During the so-called Parliamentary Republic (1891–1925), by contrast, political practice granted primacy to the Legislative Power, seriously limiting presidential authority until the Constitutions of 1925 and the current one (1980) returned the institutional center of gravity to the Executive.

Brazil constitutes another case where checks on the Executive are observed. Despite its vigorous presidentialism, high party fragmentation requires the construction of coalitions to sustain governability. This requirement, more political than derived from constitutional design, forces the president to negotiate and share power with congressional caucuses to advance his agenda, a phenomenon that the literature describes as a “de facto parliamentarization” (Silva Alves and Paiva, 2017).

In Uruguay, although the Constitution defines a “pure” presidentialism, research indicates that the formation of legislative cartels, flexible coalitions among parties, and the strengthening of the so-called Presidential Center, with political coordination offices that link the president with the caucuses, require the Executive to negotiate and share power with Congress, giving rise to an attenuated presidentialism in practice (Lanzaro, 2016). Likewise, this coalition dynamic has favored greater effectiveness in the enactment of laws and the stability of parliamentary majorities, which reinforces the consensual character of the Uruguayan political system (Chasqueti, 2011).

As can be observed, among the foreign cases mentioned, the Uruguayan model stands out, in which the formation of legislative cartels, flexible and multiparty coalitions that negotiate common agendas, and the strengthening of the Presidential Center, with instances such as the Secretariat of the Presidency and the Office of Planning and Budget permanently coordinating the Executive with the caucuses, generated an environment of stable and effective governability.

These instruments have not only increased the rate of approval of official and legislative initiatives, but have also drastically reduced institutional conflicts, maintaining a relationship of continuous cooperation between the branches of the State. This dynamic is based on a general premise that, moreover, could be the object of a comparative study between Uruguay and Peru<sup>1</sup>, thus avoiding the crises of vacancy or dissolution that characterize the Peruvian case.

### Attenuated presidentialism in Peru

According to García Belaunde (2017), Peru has sought to moderate presidential power by progressively incorporating mechanisms characteristic of parliamentarism. This process

1 It is highlighted that the proposed premise is based on a brief comparative study, because it is not the main objective of the research, which analyzes the formation and typologies of legislative cartels and the structure and function of the Presidential Center, demonstrating that both mechanisms are key explanatory variables for the stability and effectiveness of attenuated presidentialism in Uruguay, clearly differentiating it from the other Latin American models, by preventing recurrent institutional crises.

began in 1828 with the inclusion of the Minister of State and the ministerial countersignature, and continued with the institutionalization of the Council of Ministers in 1856. Along with this, instruments such as interpellation and the vote of censure were introduced, which would be constitutionalized in the Constitutions of 1860 and 1920. Subsequently, the 1933 Constitution incorporated the vote of confidence at the beginning of the ministerial mandate, strengthening the role of Congress and promoting greater collaboration between the Legislative and the Executive in order to achieve a more balanced and functional government.

Once this historical clarification has been made, the first point to consider is what was stated by Eguiguren Praeli (2009), regarding the fact that “the progressive incorporation of a significant set of institutions originating from the parliamentary regime into the Peruvian presidential model, configuring a hybrid regime known as ‘attenuated presidentialism’” (p. 19), sought to introduce mechanisms of greater control, counterbalance, and rationalization of the excessive political power of the President of the Republic.

From the cited text, three central ideas should be highlighted:

- a) The incorporation of parliamentary institutions within an originally presidential model has given rise to a hybrid regime.
- b) This transformation sought to limit and counterbalance the power concentrated in the President of the Republic.
- c) Nevertheless, these mechanisms, when operating within a presidentialist logic, do not produce the same institutional effects as in a parliamentary regime.

In this way, attenuated presidentialism in Peru constitutes a complex form of government, in which institutional mixture alters the classical balance of the presidential model and poses significant challenges in its practical application. Based on this premise, it is necessary to examine which are the main parliamentary mechanisms incorporated into Peruvian presidentialism and how they operate within its institutional dynamics.

In turn, the constitutional text articulates a system of checks and balances (Campos, 2023), with mechanisms grouped as follows:

- a) Mechanisms of control of Congress over the Executive:
  - Mandatory vote of confidence at the beginning of the ministerial term (art. 130).
  - Requests for information to any public authority (art. 96).
  - Invitation to ministers and question time to render accounts (art. 129).
  - Creation of investigative committees with special powers (art. 97).
  - Interpellation of ministers to explain decisions or policies (art. 131).
  - Censure of ministers with a majority vote of Congress (art. 132).
  - *Ex post* control over legislative decrees and emergency decrees (arts. 104 and 118.19).
  - Supervision of the handling of international treaties and states of emergency or siege (art. 137).
- b) Mechanisms of the Executive with respect to Congress:
  - Optional question of confidence to promote policies or decisions (art. 133).
  - Observation of laws approved by Congress prior to their promulgation (art. 108).
  - Dissolution of Congress if confidence is denied to two Councils of Ministers (art. 134).

In this way, it is evident that attenuated presidentialism in Peru not only represents the incorporation of parliamentary mechanisms into the predominant presidentialism of the



Peruvian State, but also a delicate system of checks and balances that seeks to balance the exercise of power between the Executive and the Legislative. The constitutional mechanisms identified by the jurist reflect various legal mechanisms intended to limit presidential excesses and strengthen the oversight role of Congress. However, their effectiveness depends to a large extent on political will and respect for the principle of cooperation between branches of government, seeking to further deepen what has been stated regarding the mechanisms of parliamentarism introduced into presidentialism. In this sense, it is appropriate to note that control is not exercised solely from the Legislative over the Executive, since, in reality, there is mutual control between both branches of the State.

Moreover, there is self-control within the Executive itself, specifically between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers. On this matter, synthesizing the ideas of García Marín (2021), this interrelation of control between both branches of the State is presented as follows:

- a) The President of the Council of Ministers is appointed by the President, but must obtain the vote of confidence of Congress within the first thirty days of the term. In turn, the President of the Council of Ministers may be removed due to loss of confidence, censure, or by decision of the President.
- b) The President requires ministerial countersignature for his acts, which aggravates cabinet crises when the Council of Ministers resigns as a whole. This requirement strengthens the political role of the cabinet vis-à-vis the Executive.
- c) The President has the power to dissolve Congress if it censures or denies confidence to two Councils of Ministers. Thus, this tool strengthens the Executive vis-à-vis the Legislative and may be used as a mechanism of pressure.
- d) The presidential term lasts five years and allows non-immediate reelection. Congress is unicameral and has 130 members since 2011.
- e) The President has two vice presidents, who have no relevant functions and usually perform secondary roles (2021).

Thus, Peruvian attenuated presidentialism constitutes a form of government structured on the bases of classical presidentialism, but enriched and made more complex by the progressive incorporation of tools characteristic of parliamentarism.

### Ambivalence of attenuated presidentialism

According to the Student's Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, the concept of "ambivalence" refers to something that "presents two interpretations or two values" (n.d.). Thus, linking the meaning presented with the term attenuated presidentialism, it is understood that this concept can be comprehended in at least two different ways.

Once the clarification regarding the term ambivalence has been made, attention should be paid to what was stated by Eguiguren Praeli (2024), observing the Peruvian political experience of the last 90 years, it can be affirmed that the main conclusion regarding the implications of incorporating numerous institutions of a parliamentary type into a presidential regime is that the same constitutional normative design functions in a quite different manner depending on the political composition of Congress and its relationship of support or confrontation with the Executive Branch.

The ambivalence of attenuated presidentialism lies in its capacity to produce opposite effects depending on the political context in which it operates. Furthermore, this dual possibility derived from its hybrid nature provides evidence that it is not a neutral model, but one conditioned by extra-legal factors, such as party fragmentation and political leadership.

The effectiveness of constitutional checks and balances in Peru does not depend solely on their normative design. When the party system exhibits low institutionalization, high

volatility, and strong personalism, Congress adopts erratic or obstructionist behaviors that nullify incentives for cooperation. Precisely, comparative research on Latin American presidentialism indicates that party fragmentation, the absence of programmatic coalitions, and the prevalence of caudillist logics multiply Executive–Legislative clashes and reduce the regime’s capacity to process conflicts in a routine manner (Olivares et al., 2022).

As Lago Carballo (1995) warned, the real challenge does not lie solely in the form taken by the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative, but in the integrity and vision with which the head of government exercises office; however, it is common that, once in power, presidents substantially alter their government plans and that the promise to govern for all is relegated.

Exemplify what has been stated in this section, it is sufficient to observe the presidents that Peru has had since the enactment of the Political Constitution of 1993. After the self-coup of 1992, the Democratic Constituent Congress, dominated by the party Cambio 90–Nueva Mayoría, allowed then-President Alberto Fujimori to approve political reforms and the 1993 Constitution without significant opposition. This favored the concentration of power in the Executive, weakening checks and balances among the branches of government and facilitating the establishment of an authoritarian regime with a democratic appearance (García Belaunde, 2015).

On the other hand, when analyzing the evolution of attenuated presidentialism in Peru after the Fujimori government, an initial period of transition is observed under the presidency of Valentín Paniagua, followed by the governments of Alejandro Toledo, Alan García, and Ollanta Humala. According to García Belaunde (2015), although none of these latter three presidents had their own majority in Congress, all managed to establish political consensuses that significantly contributed to maintaining governability and institutional stability in the country.

In the case of the governments mentioned, it was observed that the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative was characterized by a dynamic of cooperation and constant negotiation, although not of long duration. During the term of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), for example, the fragmentation of Congress required cross-cutting agreements and circumstantial parliamentary alliances to ensure the approval of legislative initiatives and essential public budgets. Particularly noteworthy was the alliance between Perú Posible and the Frente Independiente Moralizador, which, although limited, allowed for a certain level of governability to be sustained, both in Congress and in the Executive, in the face of the precarious majorities that characterized that period (García Marín, 2024).

Similarly, during the government of Alan García (2006–2011), the political strategy was marked by continuous dialogue with various political forces, which, despite existing polarization, allowed for the approval of key policies in economic and social matters. Likewise, the government of Ollanta Humala (2011–2016), despite facing a highly fragmented Congress and various ministerial crises, managed to maintain relative stability by privileging negotiation and the search for broad consensuses on fundamental issues. These examples show that, in contexts where political confrontation may put governability at risk, the success of attenuated presidentialism depends significantly on political commitment and the capacity for democratic negotiation among the institutional actors involved.

During this term, it is observed that the government of Alan García opted for a political strategy based on selective negotiation with different parliamentary blocs, rather than forming a stable coalition. This logic of specific agreements allowed him to overcome the fragmentation of Congress and advance key reforms, such as the approval of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and laws aimed at promoting foreign investment. These negotiations, although informal and without solid institutionalization, were essential to sustain the government’s economic agenda. In parallel, social programs and educational



reforms were promoted, which, although responding to structural demands, were not exempt from tensions or from growing social conflict. Thus, the government combined legislative dialogue with a strategy of authoritarian control in the face of protest, showing that political stability during this period was sustained both by the ability to reach consensus in Congress and by the use of coercive mechanisms against dissent (Meléndez and León, 2009).

In the case of Ollanta Humala's term, the need to forge agreements was even more pronounced. His coalition Gana Perú debuted with 47 seats, one third of Congress, but the caucus collapsed to 26 seats due to resignations and internal divisions. Faced with the impossibility of building its own majority, the Executive resorted to rotating majorities, that is, the formation of changing blocs for each decisive vote. For example, it sealed an early agreement with Perú Posible to ensure the investiture of the first cabinet and the "road map" that moderated the original program. In addition, it negotiated specific support with Fujimorismo and center-right caucuses to approve the mining levy, annual budgets, and 131 legislative decrees in tax and security matters; and it added multiparty support for emblematic social initiatives such as Pensión 65 and Beca 18, offering in exchange infrastructure projects and regional adjustments in the allocation of resources (García Marín, 2024).

However, contrary to the situations mentioned, in the 2016 elections, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the presidency, but Fujimorismo obtained a significant majority in Congress. Thus, parliament was controlled by a majority opposition from a single party, which allowed Fujimorismo to block or impose laws and censure the government without the need for alliances. From the outset, the opposition adopted a confrontational stance, resulting in the resignation of ministers, attempts at presidential impeachment, and a succession with Martín Vizcarra. The latter, without parliamentary support, confronted the opposition, obtaining popular support and presenting constitutional and political reforms. The continuous confrontation culminated in the dissolution of Congress by Vizcarra (Eguiguren Praeli, 2019).

The experience initiated with Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and continued by Martín Vizcarra evidences the reverse side of attenuated presidentialism: when the Executive lacks support and the majority opposition renounces any formula of agreement, governability erodes rapidly. Elected without his own majority in parliament, Kuczynski was at the mercy of a Congress dominated by Fuerza Popular, which used its numerical superiority to censure ministers, block projects, and force two impeachment attempts; the pressure concluded with his resignation in March 2018.

Former president Vizcarra inherited the same adverse scenario and, without a loyal caucus, sought to legitimize his administration before the citizenry by promoting an anti-corruption package. The parliamentary reaction, again obstructionist and focused on curtailing Executive powers, led to an institutional confrontation that the president resolved with the constitutional dissolution of Congress on September 30, 2019. The episode confirms that the absence of minimal alliances between branches of government, combined with the maximalist use of parliamentary instruments, can paralyze governmental action and drag the system toward traumatic exits, even within the legal framework (Paredes and Encinas, 2020). Vizcarra adopted a popular leadership style, appealed to citizen support, and deepened confrontation by prioritizing anti-corruption reforms against an opposition that feared losing power quotas. The absence of a dialogue table with clear rules led to the constitutional closure of Parliament in September 2019 (Chiaraviglio et al., 2021).

After the transitional government of Francisco Sagasti, a particularly critical period developed during the administration of Pedro Castillo, characterized by a relationship openly full of confrontations between the Executive Branch and Congress, which operated practically as antagonistic forces. To support this assertion, reference is made to the analysis developed by Oblitas Villalobos (2024).

From the beginning of Pedro Castillo's government in July 2021, the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative was tense and marked by constant clashes. Castillo faced three impeachment motions: the first two did not succeed due to a lack of votes; while the third, better supported legally and factually, advanced in a context of strong political fragmentation. Thus, faced with this situation, on December 7, 2022, Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress. Nevertheless, the result was his detention for alleged crimes of rebellion or conspiracy.

Finally, in the current government of Dina Boluarte, Palomino Manchego and Paiva Goyburu (2024) observe that the relationship between the Executive and Congress during Boluarte's administration is less conflictive than in previous administrations. Unlike Pedro Castillo, Boluarte has not faced significant impeachment motions and does not have an official caucus, since Perú Libre has distanced itself from her administration. Meanwhile, Congress avoided direct confrontations with the Executive.

Governability depends crucially on the capacity to build minimal agreements with a fragmented Congress. Pedro Castillo, without a loyal caucus or negotiation bridges, turned each initiative into a confrontation, accumulated three impeachment attempts, and ended up precipitating his own fall by attempting to dissolve Parliament without support. In contrast, Dina Boluarte, even lacking her own caucus, reduced tension by maintaining channels of dialogue with the main opposition blocs, yielding in appointments and adjusting budgetary priorities, thus achieving a period of lower legislative conflict and relative stability.

Thus, as illustrated by the various presidents Peru has had since the enactment of the 1993 Constitution to the present, the ambivalence of attenuated presidentialism is evidenced in its practical application. It can facilitate governability in scenarios of cooperation or, on the contrary, deepen political instability in contexts of confrontation. This dual possibility, derived from its hybrid design, demonstrates that its functioning does not depend exclusively on the normative framework, but on extra-legal variables such as the correlation of forces in Congress, party fragmentation, and the political leadership of the moment. Therefore, understanding the ambivalent nature of attenuated presidentialism in Peru requires analyzing it both from constitutional theory and from its deployment in concrete political reality.

## CONCLUSIONS

Presidentialism in Latin America, and particularly in Peru, has acquired characteristics distinct from the original United States version. Through powers vested in the Executive, both due to its capacity for political leadership and its potential to generate institutional imbalances, parliamentarism is built upon constant political control, functional separation within the Executive, and a dynamic relationship with Parliament. The fundamental differences between both systems make it possible to understand the tensions inherent in the Peruvian political model. While presidentialism centralizes decision-making in a single individual, parliamentarism relies on continuous oversight and the articulation of parliamentary majorities, generating diverse impacts on the stability of the democratic system.

The performance of Peruvian attenuated presidentialism therefore rests on a triangle: a) a legal framework that enables both cooperation and veto, b) a party system capable of articulating disciplined coalitions, and c) a presidential leadership willing to negotiate and share the agenda.

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